Humes Wide Construal of the Virtues Essay -- Hume Virtues Virtue Phil

Humes Wide Construal of the VirtuesABSTRACT The term legality has traditionally been used to designate object lessonly full(a) character traits much(prenominal) as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists do not commonly offer a unequivocal list of legalitys, the number of virtues discussed is often short and their moral significance is clear. Humes digest of the virtues departs from this tradition both in terms of the quantity of virtues discussed and their obvious moral significance. A conservative estimate of the various virtues Hume refers to in his moral literary works would put the number at around seventy, with the more untraditional ones including wit, good manners, and dialog. Unsurprisingly, Humes critics contract attacked him for making nonsense of the concept of virtue by construing it so widely. Hume was aware that his broad understanding of virtue was controversial and he offered several(prenominal) defenses for it. After presenting the neglected attacks of his contemporaries along with Humes response, I argue that a problem remains by failing to distinguish between degrees of virtue, Hume likewise fails to distinguish between degrees of vice. But, some vices (e.g., malevolence) clearly deserve punishment whereas different alleged vices (e.g., uncleanliness) clearly do not. Thus, for adequate retribution, a distinction is needful between important and less important virtues and vices. I conclude that Hume could have used his own account of instinctive vengeance as a natural indicator for distinguishing between important and unimportant vices. The term virtue has traditionally been used to designate morally good character traits much(prenominal) as benevolence, charity, honesty, wisdom, and honor. Although ethicists, past and present, do ... ...f John Lelands A view of the main(prenominal) deistical writers..., in the Monthly Review, 1757, Vol. 14, pp. 465-477, and in the Critical Review, 1756, Vol. 1, pp . 193-208.(12) James Beattie, Essay on the nature and immutability of truth in opposition to sophistry and scepticism. 1770, Edinburgh, A. Kincaid and J. Bell, pp. 421-448.(13) extension of the Works of David Hume Esq, in The Weekly Magazine or Edinburgh Amusement, 1773, Vol. 22, pp. 233-234.(14) Tobias Simple, Strictures on the account of the life and writings of David Hume, in Weekly Magazine, or Edinburgh Review, 1777, Vol. 38, pp. 289-292.(15) C. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language, (New harbor 1944), pp. 34-35.(16) Pall S. Ardal, Passion and Value, (Edinburgh Edinburgh University Press, 1966), pp. 160-161.(17) J. L. Mackie, Humes Moral Theory, (London Routledge, 1980), p. 129.